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IN THE SUPREME COURT
o~F THE STAT'E OF UTAH

ALICE ~I. DONAHUE, BARBARA
DONAHUE, and CONSTANCE
DONAHUE,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-YS.-

WARNER BROTHERS PICTURES
DISTRIBUTING CORPORATION", INTER~IOUNTAIN
THEATRES, INC., ARCH E.
OVERJ\IAN and C. E. OVERMAN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No. 7965

Appellant's Reply Brief
The brief of respondents calls for a reply on some
points sought to be discussed, particularly since they
again drag into the argument the bugaboo of the ''cultural desert" that will be established in Utah unless the
movie industry is permitted to exploit the names and
personalities of deceased individuals for their profit, in
clear violation of the statute and the law of privacy as
1
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adopted by the Utah legislature. This same argument,
with the list of so-called historical novels and plays, was
presented to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, without avail; it was also presented to the 1953 session of
the Utah Legislature in an unsuccessful attempt to haYe
th.e law amended; and it was also presented to the jury
in the trial court after the trial court gave its instructions about which this appeal resolves, over the objections of plaintiffs. · The jury apparently was influenced
by the argument after the trial court advised them that
the Constitution of the United States protects the movie
industry when it puts out matter educational and informative in character, without defining or limiting what
was meant by "educational and informative" as plaintiffs contend was gross error on the part of the trial
court. So let us see what defendants have said in their
brief.
THE UTAH STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL
IF CONSTRUED TO PROHIBIT THE COM1\1:ERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF NAMES AND PERSONALITIES OF DECEASED INDIVIDUALS.
Defendants base their entire argument on this point
on the two cases recently decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States declaring that the motion picture
industry is entitled to come within the ambit of the free
speech and press provision of the Constitution. The
cases are about as much in point here as a discussion of
the Rule in Shelley's Case.
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The case of B~trstyn vs. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 72 S.
Ct. 777, invalidated a censorship statute of the State of
Ne"T York. Utah has not created a censorship statute
and the fact that heirs have a right to complain for
violation of the right of privacy or improper use of the
name of a deceased parent does not constitute censorship. The press has a.I,vays been amenable to the laws
of privacy, libel, slander and the copyright laws, and
the fact that, by this decision, the movie industry is also
decreed to be a member of the press does not enlarge
those rights and extend them beyond other members of
the press. Censorship of the press has always been
unlawful, but the press has always been liable for infraction of the laws of privacy.
The case of Gelling vs. Texas, 343 U. S. 960, 72 S.
Ct. 1002, is to the same effect. It invalidated a censorship ordinance.
Upon the basis of those two cases defendant would
destroy the entire law of privacy as applied to the movie
industry upon the fallacious argument that the right of
a party to seek redress for damages and to seek injunctive relief against continued infraction of the law are
the equivalent of censorship in advance of something
that some Board regards as irreligious or improper.
It is in this argument at page 51 of their brief,
where defendant shows its full hand. After arguing that
by the above cases the movie industry is now a member
of the press, hence free from censorship, which accord3
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ing to their argument means immunity from prosecution
for violation of the law, they make the following startling
statement:
"However, in literature and the arts- the
graphic as well as the literary arts-"~e deal ''yith
the dead not only factually but also fictionally,
not only in actuality but also in the imagination.
Both factual and fictional publications concerning
the noted figures \vho have gone before us are an
essential part of our cu·lture, and the unrestrained
right to continue such publications is necessary
for the survival of that culture in the form in
\vhich we now know it." (Italics added.)
There it is right out in the open. There can no
longer be any doubt as to what they are asking this court
to declare to be the law of Utah and as to \Yhat the trial
court did declare. The moment an individual's eyes are
closed in death his name, his person~lity, his reputation
and his fame are open to exploitation, factually and
fictionally to the movie industry. That would be mighty
dangerous law for this Court to declare in the face of
our statute.
Death seems to be the opening wedge, as we understand the purport of the argument. What they cannot
do with the name, personality and reputation of a living
person because of the statute and the common law rule
of privacy, they say they can do with the deceased individual. If we understand the argument correctly this
is because, when an individual dies his life becomes an
open book, for all to read, as a part of history, a part
of the cultural life of society. If this is true as to ae4
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ceased persons, 'Y hy is it not also true as to living
persons f If, as arg·ued by defendant, the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Burstyn and Gelling cases
put a cloak of immunity over the movie industry by
reason of its newly acquired status as a. part of the
press, "Thy '-rould not that also have the effect of opening
the door to the exploitation of the names, personalities
and reputations of the living persons~ So far as the
press is concerned there is no difference. So far as
history, art and biography are concerned there is no
difference in principle. Why could they not, if what
they say is correct law, have someone impersonate anyone of the great personages of our State or the Nation
and pack the movie houses by selling both names, the
individual impersonated and the actor doing the impersonating~ It would be mighty thin ice to skate on, but
that is the effect and result of their position.
Of course public characters invite public comment,
criticism and public discussion in the press, on the radio,
television and in newsreels of the movies, of their public
performances and utterances. It may be done by photograph, the written word, caricature or even by playacting. But the cases are uniform in holding that there
are definite limitations on that right as to living public
characters. This subject was well discussed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit in this. case.
Representatives of the press lose their immunity and are
liable under the laws relating to privacy, libel and
slander the same as anyone else when they go beyond
their functions as members of the press. Two things
5
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they may not do : (a) Use the name of a public figure
'for purposes of trade or advertising, whether true or
untrue, and whether favorable or unfavorable; or (b)
so fictionalize the discussion or rendition as to make it
basically untrue as either a news item or historical
account of a public figure. In this case they violated
both of these limitations.
Now, let us see whether the Utah statute is unconstitutional because it includes the provision with reference to deceased persons.
The New York statute, which is the same as the
Utah statute excepting as to deceased persons, was held
to be constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Rhodes vs. Sperry and Hutchinson,
220 U. S. 502, 55 L. Ed. 561, upon the ground that this
\vas a proper subject matter for legislative action. In
fact the court said that this right of legislation cannot
be questioned. Why may not the legislature similarly
protect the name, personality and reputation of a deceased individual, if the subject matter is proper for the
legislature to consider with reference to living individuals 1 Why may not the State legislature create such
a cause of action on behalf of the heirs 1 Congress did
so in the copyright laws to protect the literary utterances
of deceased individuals. Why is not the name or photograph of a deceased individual a proper subject matter
for legislative consideration~ It is for the State to
determine what is and is not property and what rights
of action are created in favor of heirs.
6
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rrhe Burstyn and Gelling cases did not overrule or
even consider the case of Rhodes vs. Sperry and Hutchinson and it is pure sophistry to argue that they have
that effect.
All branches of the press, newspapers, radios,
movies and television have been held amenable to the
la"cs of privacy, some to be held liable where they went
too far and some to be exonerated where they kept within
bounds, but nowhere, in any court, have we found any
sanction for any member of the press to do as it pleases,
"factually or :fictionally, not only in actuality but also
in imagination'', as recited by defendant-nor may they
or anyone else do it at all for purposes of trade, which
is something different from their press activities.
Counsel refers slightingly and with some disdain
and condescention to the decision of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in this case and to our discussion of
New York cases, implying that they represent ancient
ideas, outmoded and decadent, and that New York is
rapidly back-tracking from some of those ideas. Quite
the contrary is true. The most recent case from New
York, under the New York statute, goes farther in protecting an individual's name against this type of exploitation than any of the former cases. We refer to
the case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum.,
Inc., 202 Fed. 2d 866, decided February 16, 1953, by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, opinion written
by Judge Frank. The question in that case was whether
a ball player's name and photograph were an assignable

7
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right under the Ne'v York statute (Sec. 50 and 51 of the
Civil Rights Law-from which our law was taken and
enlarged). Here is what was said on the right of an individual to have his name protected:
"With regard to such situations, we must consider defendant's contention that none of plaintiff's contracts created more than a release of
liability, because a man has no legal interest in
the publication of his picture other than his right
of privacy, i.e., a personal and non-assignable
right not to have his feelings hurt by such a publication.
''A majority of this court rejects this contention. We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in N e"T York
derives from statute), a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right
to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his
picture, and that such a grant may validly be
made 'in gross,' i.e., without an accompanying
transfer of a business or of anything else.
Whether it be labelled a 'property' right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag
'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts
·
enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth.
''This right might be called a 'right of publicity.' For it is common knowledge that many
prominent persons (especially actors and ball
players), far from having their feelings bruised
through public exposure of their likenesses, \vould
feel sorely deprived if they no longer recei Yrd
money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers,
magazines, busses, trains and subways. This right
of publicity would usually yield them no money
unless it could be made the subjef•t of nn ex('lusive
8
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grant "~hich barred any other advertiser from
using their pictures.
'' \\T e think the N e'Y York decisions recognize

such a right. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff
Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214; Madison
Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co.,
255 App. Div. 459, 465, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 845; Cf. Liebig's Extract of ~!eat Co. v. Liebig Extract Co.,
2 Cir ., 180 F. 688.
"We think Pekas Co., Inc. v. Leslie,* decided
in 1915 by Justice Greenbaum sitting in the Sppreme Court Term, is not controlling sinceapart from a doubt as to whether an opinion of
that court must be taken by us as an authoritative
exposition of New York law-the opinion shows
that the judge had his attention directed by
plaintiff exclusively to Sections 50 and 51 of the
New York statute, and, accordingly, held that the
right of privacy was 'purely personal and not
assignable' because 'rights for outraged feelings
are no more assignable than would be a claim
arising from a libelous utterance.' We do not
agree with Hanna 11fg. Co. v. Hillerich & Brads by
Co., 5 Cir., 78 F. 2d 763, 101 A.L.R. 484; see adverse comments on that decision in 36 Col. Law
Rev. (1936) 502, 49 Harv. Law Rev. (1936) 496,
and 45 Yale L. J. (1936) 520."
That decision has come down since this case was
tried. If, as there stated, the right to use and protect
one's name and photograph is an assignable right, which
is the yardstick by which we determine what may be
inherited, why may not the legislature protect that right
and confer on the heirs the right of action to enforce it~
The answer is obvious.
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Defendants are far afield in their constitutional
argument, and they have manifested the error of the
trial court in permitting the introduction of the evidence
of the experts to prove the educational value of the
picture and in instructing the jury on this question.
THE RIGHT IN A NAME AND PHOTOGRAPH
IS NOT LIMITED TO INJURY TO FEELINGS.
There is one statement in the brief of defendants
that could be misleading and we feel that it should be
corrected. The ruling of the trial court denying our
right to amend the complaint was on the merits-not,
as is inferred, because it was not timely. The original
allegations of paragraph IX are not the same, in either
substance or effect, as the amendment that was proposed.
Failure to sell a particular manuscript is an entirely
different proposition from exploiting and appropriating
a property right.
The record shows that permission to file this amendment was originally requested from Judge Martin Larson, and permission was granted. Counsel for defendant
then had Judge Larson strike this ruling upon the
ground that it had not been argued. In the meantime
the case had been assigned to Judge VanCott and it was
again presented to the court where it was fully argued
on the merits. This was long before the trial and no
objection was made on the ground that it was late.
Rule 15 provides that leave to file amendments shall
be freely given 'vhen justice so requires.

10
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The point 'Ya.s properly raised, fully presented on
the merits and the ruling was on the merits, and is
properly before this court on appeal.
In addition to the authorities cited in our original
brief, the recent case of Haelen Laboratories vs. Topp
Cheu·i.ng G~tm, supra, recently decided by the Circuit
Court· of Appeals, Second Circuit, construing the New
York statute, quoted above, is directly in point on this
question.
Of course, many of the cases relating to privacy
have to do with injury to feelings, but not all of them.
That applies in only one branch of the law where someone digs up something unpleasant and exposes it. But
the law is broader than that. The whole basis of the law
under which famous people license others and permit
their names and photographs to be used in selling commodities is based on the broader principle of a property
right or "right of publicity" as stated by the above
court, which can be assigned or granted. If this court
were to announce that ''injury to feelings'' is the only
basis for damages for violation of our statute as argued
by defendants in their brief, they would in effect nullify
the statute, because, as said by Judge Frank, the greater
the publicity the more valuable the name. As with trademarks and copyrights, the thing or right protected is
not open for the exploitation of others without permission, which may be granted or withheld at the option
of the owner.

11
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CONCLUSION
Defendants shed copious tears over ".,.hat IS going
to happen to the poor people of Utah unless this la-,v· is
emasculated or destroyed by this court. It is not for us
to advise defendants as to how to abide by the law. They
seem to haYe been able to find the answer so far as the
rights of living people are concerned. They either obtain
the right to use their names and photographs, or, if
members of the press, they stay within bounds, or they
do not use them. The same means are open so far as the
heirs of deceased persons are concerned. It is not an
insuperable obstacle. In any event, the remedy is with
the Legislature, not with the courts. If tears are shed
because of our legislative policy, let them be our tears,
not those of defendants. If it proves too burdensome
for the people of Utah to carry or if the law is too broad,
it will be time then for the Legislature to reconsider its
action. Until then, it is the law.
Defendant's argument about the bugaboo of a cultural desert in Utah ringed by a celluloid curtain that
the Hollywood magnates will ring down to isolate our
State from the cultural and educational advantages of
the story of Abe Lincoln and Anne Rutledge may be
answered shortly by a common-sense interpretation of
our statute. The Act, Section 103-4-9, Utah Code Annotated 1943, gives a right of action to the "heirs or personal representative'' of a deceased person. By coupling
"heirs" with "personal representatives", the person
who disposes of a decedent's assets and sPttles his lin hili-

12
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ties, it is clear that the Legislature did not mean remote
or collateral generations, but the immediate heirs, the
\Yido\Y and children \Yho 'vould be immediately affected
by the invasion of their priYate memories or whose livelihood \Yhich the name of the ancestor created is crippled
by a free ride '"'hich might be enjoyed by those who would
invade the right or exploit the financial situation. Such
an interpretation leaves the gate wide open for education
and growth upon the cultural advantages of the past but
still protects, in this State, the privacy and the property
rights of \Yidows and children from commercial exploitation whether in books, bags, bottles, billboards, or even
the movie film.
And we respectfully submit that it is a good law. If
it is constitutional, appropriate and wise to protect the
name, personality and reputation of the living against
commercial exploitation by others without written permission, why is it not equally wise to protect the immediate heirs of deceased persons against similar conduct 1
I_jet us paraphrase one of the arguments of defendant by
saying that what is one man's fun and laughter is another
man's sorrow. It may be perfectly delightful to an
audience to see Will Rogers or Jack Donahue wisecracking, telling jokes on themselves, and doing most
anything for a laugh, even at their own expense, but in
sacred memory very disturbing and distressing to the
widow and daughters to have someone tell them in effect
that they have no rights to protest the commercial exploitation of the name.

13
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Let us see, by appropriate application, what it is
that defendant says is the proper interpretation of the
Utah statute. They say in effect that if someone were
to put out a brand of Brigham Young cigars his children
or grandchildren coul~ complain and stop it, but if they
put out a movie fictionalizing his life for audience appeal,
plastering the billboards with advertisements, they would
be helpless to protest in Utah, regardless of our statute
and what may be the situation elsewhere. The cases,
under the New York statute do not say that. Fictionalization, excepting minor and inconsequential inaccuracies,
destroys the production as a biographical production,
and makes it commercial in character. That is the law
as it has been to this date, and the two cases that defendant relies on for its entire· defense do not even
discuss the subject, let alone overrule it.
The remaining points are amply discussed in our
original brief.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH AND ELTON
By H. A. Rich
Attorneys for Appellants
FABIAN, CLENDENIN,
MOFFAT & MABEY
By Peter W. Billings
Associate Cownsel for
Appella;nts on Brief
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